Thoughts on the World Food Crisis. by O'Keefe, Phil
710
THOUGHTS ON THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS:
Phil O’Keefe
FREDERICK C. CUNY & ASSOCIATES
INTERTEGT
SOM*  'J
V Phil G
The world has enough for every man's need but 
not enough for every man's greed.' (Gandhi)
■>/ /
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On a bleary Saturday morning in Bradford it might seem a little 
strange to open a Conference on the World Economic. 0risis with a quotation 
from Gar oh i » However, the message that there are sufficient resources icr
everyone in today's world has a more pressing importance new than it 
possessed a generation ago. The essential truth of the message must 
drive us to find some mechanism so that resources are equitably shared, sc 
that, as Shakespeare observed,
'Distribution should undo excess'
This paper attempts to place the most serious aspect of the current 
economic crisis,the world food shortage, into a perspective of need and 
greed, a perspective of an artificial crisis created by the developed 
countries, a. perspective of planned proiitecring which, as M. Pierre Larainoi 
the EEC Commissioner for Agriculture, has stated, will result in a situation 
in. which more people will die from starvation than from war (Kafierty, 19,“ * 
It is necessary at the beginning of this paper, to describe she actuality 
of world famine, the spectre of hunger that haunts mankind. _ To do so, let 
us ask ourselves a series of questions and,later, provide seme solutions to 
the problem of famine.
QUESTION 1. WHAT IS THE CUPP ENT FAMINE POSITION IN THE WOxIP'?
I sit, often Idly, at a desk in the University of Bradford. Occasional!*
something stirs me from my comatose condition and inspires me to work. 
Thursday the 13th of February was such a day. A neatly printed copy of 
the FAO Early Warning System for Food Shortages up..eared on my desk. Three
countries were suffering from serious food shortages, eleven countries were
2experiencing food shortages, one country was on the brink of food shortage
splendour of Bradford, it is 'difficult to imagine the human reality of
irig of hunger to our children, how many of us have ever lived famine?
In that year, world output of food declined for the first time in 20 years: 
output of cereals alone fell by 33 million tons. To meet current demand, 
world output must increase by about 23 million tons. Wheat stocks fell 
from ^9 million tons in 1971/72 to 20 million tons in 1972/73* Similarly 
coarse grain stocks fell and rice reserves were virtually exhausted. Al­
though poor climatic conditions have existed over much of sub-Saharan
Africa and the Asian Sub-Continent- for the last- seven years, climatic con-
ause is the economic boom of the early seventies which has given us a
World Food Conference 197*0 • The commodity markets encouraged bullish
tence. Thai white rice, for example, f.o.b. Bangkok, cost US$131 per 
tonne in January 1972, but by April 197*N had risen to US$630 a tonne, a
price for US maize and wheat rose by 123 and 173 per cent respectively 
(Tinker, 197*0. Acute famine is only one aspect of the current crisis:
developed countries produced or imported substantially less food in 1970
and smother eleven had given warning of poor harvests. Sitting in the
these facts and figures, but how many of us could really explain the mean-
The present world food crisis^ originating from a combination of longer 
term problems and temporary .setbacks caught the world’s attention in 1972.
dptlons: are not. the cause of; the current food shortage (O’Keefe, 1973a' * The
) Q Ptv
’f highly buoyant demand for commodities and an inflationary situation accen- 
\t " ftuated by monetary instability and speculative acti Although the
strong demand fer most of the food and agricultural commodities have improved
the. terms, of ..trade of. primary products., the gains, in expert earnings have
not been evenly shared and the developed countries have gained more, (UN
7 speculation in food but such speculation is speculation on people's exis­
staggering increase of 3^0 per cent. Over the same period, the exporr
the other is chronic malnutrition. FA0 estimates -.hat 6l out of $7 under­
than was necessary to feed their populations. On a conservative estimate 
-FAO calculates- that Q60 million people suffer from malnutrition; a more 
liberal interpretation would place the figure around a 1,000 million, over 
a. third of the world's population. To understand why, in 1975* so many 
fellow citizens of mother earth should suffer, we must raise the second 
question about the nature of world development.
QUESTION THAT DOES DEVELOPMENT REALLY MEAN?
One of the basic difficulties in defining what we mean by development 
is that there are as many definitions of decelcpment as there are economists, 
geographers, sociologists etc. It is apparent, however, that three dis­
tinct groupings emerge from the debate, namely,
a. those who favour a growth orientated policy,
b. those who favour a 'modernisation policy,
c. those who favour an ecological approach which attempts to 
utilise indigenous resources.
True development 'is not growth for growth, as booming GNI^  merely results
•.✓ , , , | in an increased concentration of income in the hands of a minority. True
(  „• H  /- •>- * ' •
V  l ( ^-development is not modernisation, for modernisation encourages., the draining
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extent to which society puts that understanding into practice (technolcfgy)^;4
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and on the manner in which society is organised. This definition basically 
suggests that if a society is dependent, it is not developed; dependency 
means that a society does not have self-determination of its own resources.
For example, the largest farm in the world, the Gezira of the Sudan, relies 
on western technology; should that technology be withdrawn, the Gezira
Scheme becomes resourceless because its capital intensive mode of produc-
Lion rollon on western L-: onroloo; . The overall effect of thin depend on?;- 
relationship is that, while development continues in the rich countries, u 
concomitant, negative orocess of underdevelopment occurs in the Third ..orid. 
For successful development in. the western world, it requires that we extra. >- 
the resources, the raw materials, from the Third World and force it into a 
dynamic condition, the development of underdevelopment. This situation 
is neatly summarised by world trade statistics which indicate that, although 
world trade did grow by 6.9 per .cent between 195l amid 196/ the share of 
the underdeveloped countries dropped from 2? to 19 per cent in the same 
time span without a compensating increase in the heme markets. The situa­
tion simply reflects the old adage that the rich get richer and the poor 
get poorer. It is of paramount importance, however, that we consider the 
implications of this underdevelopment process and so ask the next question 
(O'Keefe, 1979b).
QUESTION 3. WHAT HAPPENS TO PEOPLE WHEN THEY ARE UNDERDEVELOPED?
I love Ken Dodd smd the Diddymen. ' I'll correct that - I love Ken
Dodd and the Diddymen as long as they do not 'marmalise' dissenting jam-butty
mine workers. Marmalise is a word which sounds similar to the one with
which we describe how people are underdeveloped - they are marginalised.
Marginalisation means that they become border-line cases on the ecological
<99 ouui ' hr -i'-z f
limits of deserts and flood plains. The Tuareg in the Sahel, the^ampeeinos" 
in Honduras,vine^peasants -in Bangladesh^ are in such a position; they are 
vulnerable to disaster, but vulnerable because various pieces of legislation 
on land}world food prices etc. force them to the extremity of existence.
They are marginalised into permanent poverty (Baird, 1973).
Underdevelopment and marginalisation promote an economic concentration 
of wealth in the hands of the few. To scientifically' assess the problem 
of low income groups it is necessary m  define the concept of poverty. Two 
levels of poverty can be defined, namely relative inequality and absolute 
poverty. The conventional approach to inequality is to define the problem
•./'
/  •
in relative terms. Thus we measure inequality by the extent to whicM tn- 
income share of groups of individuals or households differs from their 
■population share._ Socialist countries have the highest degree of overall 
equality in income distribution because the ownership of capital does not 
accrue as capital to individuals. Table I shows a cross-classification 
of countries by income level and equality arid it is obvious that most 
underdeveloped countries show a markedly greater relative inequality than 
developed countries. This greater relative inequality, preserved by the 
indigenous elite and bolstered by outside interests, prolongs the develop­
ment of underdevelopment. The extent of relative inequality does not
■
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tell us much about the extent of absolute poverty. Table II indicates 1 -
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the percentage population beneath an arbitrary poverty line of US$75 per j
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annum in 1971. These figures should be compared with those in Table I. ’ ^  ?-•
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For example, both Ecuador and Sri Lanka have about one-third of their , £ \  ^  -y *
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’population beneath the poverty line, although Ecuador’s income is three . v ■ } \ *
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times as high (Ahluwalia, 1971*). Almost 600 million people receive less V  
than US$75 per_ annum_=,it almost puts us off our lunch- But let us now 
ask the next question, a question about the reality of poverty.
QUESTION k . WHAT ARE THE ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES OF POVERTY?
Less than US$75 each year, less than £25 each year; could we buy cur
<9
beer, our cosmetics for a year on such a budget'. Such a budget would 
produce starvation but what do we know about starvation? Ask the question 
again,
’Could we explain hunger to our children?’
n / U r t ~  I d - ' .
/A'protein deficiency is eg g in poverty situations; malnutrition
v ,>7 ^
is normally due to an inadequate intake of/food* \ '-underdeveloped countries
* A  f K
any extra protein usually goes to the rich, the elite we have already 
identified as encouraging underdevelopment. Qbv in uni y r ^iier eqi sEf e i^sVbratpL
for'lhn"|>cor. The false description of world poverty, of the world fcod
L  i n
crisis as a poverty of protein tends to establish a diagnosis of human problems

6TABLE la.
Cross-classification of countries by income level.and equality
HIGH INEQUALITY: Share of lov/est kCf/c 1ess than 1 2 %
Country (year)
Per capita 
GNP US3" Lowest h 0 %  Middle W Top 20°%
Kenya (1969) 196 10.0 22.0 68.0
Sierra Leone (1968) 199 9.6 2 2  A 68.0
Iraq (1996) 200 6.8 23.2 68.0
Philippines (1971) 299 11.6 3^.6 53-8
Senegal (i960) 2^9 10.0 26.0 6*+.0
Ivory Coast (1970) 2 k 7 10.8 32.1 37.1
Rhodesia (19680 292 8.2 22.8 69.O
Tunisia (1970) 299 l i . b 3?. 6 33.0
Honduras (1968) 269 6.5 28.3 65.0
Ecuador (1970) ‘ 277 6.3 20.0 73-3
El Salvador (1969) 299 11.2 36.*f 32.*+
Turkey (1968) 282 9.3 29-9 60.8
Malaysia (1970) ’ 390 11.6 32.*+ 56.0
Colombia (1970) 358 9.0 30.0 61.0
Brazil (1970) 390 10.0 28.*+ 61.3
Peru (1971) ^80 6.3 33.3 60.0
Gabon (1968) i+97 8.8 23.7 67.5
Jamaica (1938) 910 8.2 30.3 61.3
Costa Rica (1971) 321 11.5 30.0 58.5
Mexico (1969) 6 h3 10.3 25.5 6*+.o
South Africa (1963) 669 6.2 35-8 38.0
Panama (1969) 692 9 A 31.2 59.^
Venezuela (1970) 100-'+ 7-9 27-1 63.O
Finland (1962) 1399 11.1 39-6 49.3
France (1962) 1913 9*5 36.8 33-7
(Source: M.S. Ahluwalia, 197*0 •
MODERATE INEQUALITY: Share of lowest kOP/o between 12% and 17%
Country (year) Per capita. GNP US# Lowest _*+0% Middle *fC% Ton 20%,
Burma (1958) 82 16.5 38.7 *+**.8
Dahomey (1959) 87 15-5 3^.5 50.0
Tanzania (1967) 89 13.0 26.0 61.0
India (196**) ■99 16.0 32.0 52.0
Madagascar (i960) 120 13.5 25.5 61.0
Zambia (1959) 250 1**.5 28.5 57.0
Dominican Republic (1969) 525 12.2 30.5 57.5
Iran. (1968) 532 12.5 33.0 5^.5
Guyana (1956) 550 l*f.O **0 .3 '4-5-7
Lebanon (i960) 508 13.0 26.0 61.0
Uruguay (1968) 6l8 16.5 35.5 **8.0
Chile (1968) 7**** 13.0 30.2 56.8
Argentina (1970) 1079 16.5 36.1 **7 .**
Puerto Rico (1968) 1100 13.7 35.7 50.6
Netherlands (1967) 1990 13.6 37.9 **8.5
Norway (1968) - 2010 16.6 **2.9 **0 .5
Germany Fed. Rep. (196*0 21'**** 15. *f 31.7 52.9
Denmark (1968) 2563 13.6 38.8 **7.6
New Zealand (1969) 2859 15.5 **2.5 **2.0
Sweden (1963) 29**9 1**.0 **2.0 ****.0
(Source: M.S. Ahluwalia, 197*0
8LOW INEQUALITY: Share of lowest 9CQ, 17/T and abo\;re.
Country (year)
Per capita 
GNP US$ Lowest 903
Middle 9Cfo Toe 20#
Chad (19Q8) 78 18.0 39-0 93.0
Sri Lanka (1969) 95 17*0 37-0 96.0
Niger (i960) ■97 1.8.0 90.0 92.0
Pakistan (1969) 100 17.5 37-5 95.0
Uganda (1970)- 126 17.1 35.8 97.1
Thailand (1970) 180 17.0 37-5 95.5
Korea (1970) 235 18.0 37-0 95.0
Taiwan (1969) 291 20.9 39-5 90.1
Surinam (1962) 39^ 21.7 35-7 92.6
Greece (1957) 500 21.0 29-5 49.5
Yugoslavia (1968) 529 18.5 90.0 9l.5
Bulgaria (1962) 530 26.8 90.0 33-2
Spain (1965) 750 17.6 36.7 ^5-7
Poland (1969) • ' 850 23.9 90.6 36.0
Japan (1963) 950 20.7 39-3 9o.o
United Kingdom (1968) 2015 18.8 92.2 39-0
.Hungary (1969) 1190 29.0 92.5 33-5
Czechoslovakia (1969) 1150 27.6 91.9 31-9
Australia (1968) 2509 20.0 91.2 38.8
Canada (1965) 2920 20.0 39-8 90.2
United States (1970) 9850 19.7 91.5 38.8
(Source: M.S. Ahluv/alia, 1979)
TABLE II
Estimates of population below poverty line in 1969
Blow US$75
% of total 
populationCountry
1969 'GUP.
per capita
1969
population
(Millions)
Population b« 
Millions
LATIN AMERICA
Ecuador 264 5*9 3*5 58.5
Honduras 265 2.5 1.0 38.0
El Salvador 295 3.4 0.6 18.4
Dominican Republic 323 ■ 4.2 0.7 15.9
Colombia 3 k ? 20.6 5.6 27-0
Brazil 3^7 90.8 18.2 20.0
Jamaica 640 2.0 0.3 15.4
Guyana 390 0.7 0.1 15.1
Peru 480 13.1 3.3 . 25.5
Costa Rica 312 1-7 0.1 8.5
Mexico 645 48.9 8.7 17.8
Uruguay 649 2.9 0.2 5*5
Panama 692 1.4 0.21 11.0
Chile 731 9.6 n n
Venezuela 974 10.0 n n
Argentina 1054 24.0 n n
Puerto Rico 1600 2.8 n n
Average and Total 5^5 244.3 42,5 17.4
ASIA 1 -
Burma 72 27.0 19 0 2 71.0
Sri Lanka 95 12.2 7-8 63.5
India 100.. 537*0 359.3 66.9
Pakistan (Ei&W) 100 - " 111.8 64.7 57.9
Thailand 173 3U 7 15.4 44.3
Korea 224 13.3 2.3 17.0
Philippines 233 37.2 11.2 30.0
Turkey 290 3U 5 8.2 23.7
Iraa 316 9.4 3 .1 33.3
Taiwan 317 13.8 2.0 14.3
Malaysia 323 10.6 1.6 15.5
Iran 350 27.9 4.2 15.0
Lebanon 570 2.6 0.1 5.0
Average and Total 132 872.0 499*1 57.2
AFRICA
Chad
Dahomey
Tanzania
Niger
Madagascar
Uganda
75
90
92
94
119
128
3.5
2.6 
12:8
. 3.9 
6.7 
8.3
2.7
2.3 
9*3
2.3
4.7 
4.1
77.5 
90.1
72.9
59.9
69.6 
49.8
/cent,..
II /cont.-
1969 ...... Population below US3^3
TABLE
Country
196
Pcr
9 GRP 
capita
population 
(Millions) Millions
% of tota 
populatio
Sierra Leone 165 2.5 1.3 61.5
Senegal 229 3.8 1-3 33.3
Ivory Coast 237 4.8 1.4 28.3
Tunisia 2'41 4.9 1.6 32.1
Rhodesia 2 7 k 3-1 1.9 57.^
Zambia 340 4.2 0.3 7*3
Gabon 547 0.5 0.1 23.0
South Africa 729 20.2 3.1 13.3
Average and Total 303 83.8 36.6 1+3.6
Average and Grand Total 228 1200.3 578.2 48.2
k u ::
n = negligible
(Source: M.S. Ahluwalia, 1974)
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so that onl;y existent western technologies are considered to offer effective 
solutions Payne, 197*+) • The solutions offered, however, make • minimal--.- * -  
demands for a redistribution of resources but,instead, sell western tech­
nology as a panacea, a panacea that preserves underdevelopment. Although 
our view of malnutrition has changes considerably over the last few decades 
from concentrating on the protein gap to concentrating on energy requirement, 
v/e have developed and exported to underdeveloped countries an inappropriate 
technology for increasing food production. Between 1950 1970 many
billions of dollars in food aid, in development grants, in loans and 
technical assistance, via the voluntary agencies, individual governments 
and international organisations, v/ere wasted in a protein fiasco. No-one 
knows how many -people have died from chronic malnutrition over the last 
generation because food aid wrongly concentrated on protein instead of 
energy. Sometimes, as well as indirectly harming people by diverting 
resources away from the energy gap, the protein fixation of nutritionists 
has been directly damaging. V/estern scientists have anrogantly assumed
that all other races have a similar metabolism to that of Europeans whereas
fjujfc ,
most Africans and Asians are unable to tolerate lactose^, ^ V/e do not Know 
how many debilitated, undernourished people have suffered abdominal pain, 
dianrhoea and death from enthusiastic handouts of powdered milk tTinxer,
197*-+; MtLLler, 197*+)-
M. Henry Labonisse, Executive Director of UNICEF has spelt out v/hat 
/ this situation means. The evidence is strong that a child's mental develop—
\  ment depends on how well it is fed. If a child suffers from malnutrition
■ —/V'U y'W < f  i f  (A /p tv
in its first few years of life £h §  ^clga/qc es uarel that it will be mentally
backwand for life. Multiply that by 200 million children and, quite apart
from common humanity, you have an enormous v/aste of human potential (Lean,
197*+) *
Such a realistic analysis of the world poverty allows us to re-examine 
why a world food crisis arose, the next question we must answer.
Famine is often experienced in neocolonial territories; the orientatio
towards monocultural cash cropping of non-food produce, the control of land 
by multinational agribusiness and the marginalisation of the peasantry are 
constant companions to underdeveloped countries. However, the peasantry do 
make adjustments to these conditions, adjustments that we will consider late 
The real cause of the current food crisis, though, is in the developed 
world rather than in the underdeveloped world. 'he accept that the position 
of the developed world vis-a-vis the underdeveloped, leaves the latter in a 
vulnerable position, but this ’vulnerability has been exacerbated by a crisis 
of overproduction in the western world. The present shortages are the 
result of past overproduction relative to effective demand during the 1960s*, 
an abundance of cereals was produced which could not be sold on the market 
so, faced with a declining price^investment in agriculture was reduced. 
j Such a situation emphasises that real needs must be met through a planned 
system of production and not rely on archaic market forces.
To say that someone was playing with the market, to say that someone 
was playing with human lives, means that we must aportion blame. To 
aportion blame we must look at the pattern of the grain trade. These 
figures are shown in Table III where is becomes very apparent that the 
North American Continent accounts for over 90 per cent of the surplus grain.
for the artificial nature of the world crisis.
The world export price of wheat had been diminishing noticeably since 
the middle of the 1960s. The price index (based on 100 in 1963) was 9k in
1969 and 90 in 1970. From that point on the amount of land planted with 
cereal decreased. The area of land cultivated with wheat in Canada during
1970 vras 30 per cent of what had been cultivated in 1969. In the USA, the 
cultivation was 7k per cent of what had bqen cultivated in 1967- The 
effects of these restrictions, not only in the United States and Canada but
If we look at the stocking of arable land in North America, we can account
TABLE III
Changing patterns in the grain trade*
Region 193A--38 19^8-52 
(million me
I960
trie tons)
1966 1973a
North America + 5 +23 +39 +59 +91
Latin America a. a • ; + 1 0 + 5 - 3
Western Europe -22 -23 -27 -19
Eastern Europe 
USSR
and
+ 5 not known 0 - k -27
Africa + l 0 n— c. - 7 - 5
Asia + 2 - 6 -17 -3'+ -*+3
Australia and
New Zealand + 3 + 3 + 6 + 8 + 6
* Plus sign indi cates net exports,
minus sign net imports-
a Estimated
(Source: US Department of Agriculture)
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.also in Australia and Argentina are reflected in the amount of wheat 
narvested, a reduction of almost '25 per cent. Actual yields in millions 
of tons are given in.Table IV. The fluctuation of land under cultivation 
emphasises the response to the market forces and parallels the reduction 
in the wheat harvest. This information is contained in Table V (UDRY 1975)< 
Prices went through the roof. The world price index for wheat rose 
from 90 in 1970,to 96 in 1971,to 110 in 1972, to 21A in 1975 and on to 321 
in the first quarter of 197^» Speculation by Japanese, among others, stimu­
lated the rising prices. The price explosion encouraged the cultivation 
of fallow land but although acreage was increased, yield was not. In 
Canada, for example, for the 1973/7 ^ harvest the area cultivated increased 
by 16 per cent, but yields by only 2 per cent; similar figures tor tne USA 
are l b  percent and less than 3 per cent. The crisis has been generated by 
agribusiness playing the market. The analysis presented should stimulate 
us to ask the next question, a question about the immediate future.
QUESTION 6: WHAT HAPPENS NOW? ^
FAO asked the world surplus food producers to set aside 8-12 million 
tons of wheat before June 1973 to carry over the current food crisis. Al-
though the current shortfall in grain supply has been reducc-dT to 2 million 
tons from, the figure of 7*5 million tons accepted a.t the Rome Food Confer­
ence, the future is bleak. Only Iran gave a firm commitment to a «orld 
food bank. Of late, the American Food Aid Programme has been increased 
from US$891 to $1600 million, but this rise does not account for the infla­
tionary prices of cereals. Hopefully the EEC, Canada and Australia will 
increase their aid. In fact, four clear proposals came out of the Rome 
Conference, namely,
1. to improve the farming in the poorest countries so that 
they become more self-sufficient;
2. to improve food consumption in those countries;
to create a World Food Security System that will give
15
TABLE IV
V/heat Harvest 
(millions of tons)
19 6 9 /70 1 9 7 0 /7 1
U.S.A. 30.7 37.5
Canada 18.6 3 .0
Australia 1 0 .8 7 .6
Argentina 7.0 b . 2
TABLE V
Land under cultivation (USA) 
(million hectares)
1965/6 6 1966 /6 7 1 9 6 7 /6 8 1968/69 1 9 6 9 /70 1 9 7 0 /7 1 1 9 7 1 /7 2
7.3 7-1 3 .6 5 .0 8.1 9 .5 7.7
W
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adequate warning of potential famine; 
k. to establish 'liberal' trade policies.
The first two. proposals concern the underdeveloped countries themselves, 
the second two proposals concern the developed world. We might treat the 
second two proposals first and then return to the underdeveloped countries
for the real answer.
- T
To expand food production by 2QP/o in the next ten years, the aim o^
Au'tfl £'7c
FAO, would require US£35,500,a year. That might seem to us a vast sum
yet the world’s annual bill for armaments is running at US$207,000 millions 
per yean and America and Russia each spend twice more a year on defence 
than, this expenditure in survival would cost. Table VI gives a breakdown 
of the costing for the investment in survival. With the current supply 
of petrodollars circulating it is feasible that such a fund might exist,
\ but it is worth stressing at this juncture that the current oil price is
i n - k  J
X  l! -}■ A  the first realistic price that has been paid for oil; the rise of oil
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prices to US$'lO per barrel four, times as great as the price paid in mid 197.2,
I fitAv'T' . _ , .
\ reflects the value of this essential raw material. We should not too
hastily judge the Arab reluctance to part with the petrodollars faced with 
recent intimations of possible US invasion, and a knowledge that the 
developed countries stimulated the present food crisis. It seems that 
there would be great difficulty in creating a world security system.
When we consider the hollow offers of more liberal trade policies we 
need just glance at the facts to show the mythology behind the reality. The 
failure of developed nations has been abysmal over the last ten years. 
Imports among them grew from £22,000 million to £61,000 millions. The 
expansion of-imports-from underdeveloped countries grew from £8,000 millions 
to £13,000 millions widening the gap from 2.73 to 1 at the start of the 
decade to k to 1 at the end. The reality is the harsh reality of under­
development .
TABLE VI
Breakdown of UIL Fooa Programrne"gosts
General Agricultural Investment 
Overseas Aid for Agriculture 
Water and Land Development 
Crop and Meat Development 
Credit Programmes 
Fertiliser Development 
World Bank Deficit 
Special Feeding Programme 
World Food Reserve
US £> Thousanc
l8.0
6.0
2.5
1.0
1.2
3.0
2.5
1.0
0.3
35.5
i Million
If neither of the solutions to the world food problem oilered by cue
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developed world seem feasible, then let us ask the next question. v  ^ ^
. . .
QUESTION 7: THAT CAN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES DO THEMSELVES? . /; ^
x' ' The size of the problem is immense. Conventional trade cannot bridge 
the gap and underdeveloped countries cannot find the vast amount of loreign ey 
 ^change needed; we estimate that some £7?000 million per annum are needed 
1 'for cereal requirements alone.
We accept that ‘these countries are in a dynamic, negative condition of 
underdevelopment but sire they doing nothing to help themselves? Do they 
wait until the developed world declares a disaster or do they make thei^ 
own adjustments to the situation? Evidence is rapidly coming to the fore 
/ that extremely intelligent adjustments—ax-e—being -made" to these-hasu-Ldcus
situations by the peasant population. It is only when their disa.ster situa­
tion exceeds their resource potent:al that outside aid is requested. How­
ever, the very resource potential is limited by dependency and underdevelop-
f > '
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lament. Thus V/isner writes of the current famine in Cape Verde,
w"
’Direct drain of labour power, as important 
as it is in Cape Verde ..., is only a beginning.
I y  £y  . L llJ'y In Cape Verde, other burdens are super
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domestic econo y orce o c  on non­
food or food export crops; internal migration 
to the cities; research and farm extension ser­
vices focused exclusively on the problems of 
large-scale, export-orientated farms; neglect 
of the supportive care for the rural worker -.. 
The,growing insult is thatjin Cape Verde^Portugal 
refused even to acknowledge the existence oi 
drought and famine ... (even though the peasants’ 
party) had announced these conditions as early as 
1971’ (Wisner, 1975)*
.n it :en that outside int< .ct the peasant population
holding them under a yoke of hunger. Despite a large body of scientific
j
.iterature emphasising peasant ri: :essment, :e west ern world, still
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regards the peasant as an ignorant lazy person (Cf. White, 1979)•
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7 The trap of famine increases rather than decreases the permanency of
^ underdevelopment. ' In the fifty or so years between 1920 and 1973 the 
number of persons engaged in agriculture in the developing world rose from 
approximately 2^0,000,000 to 930,000,000. In the,,same space of time, 
the acreage of agricultural land increased by only a quarter. Even when
VJ
there is opportunity in the countryside, young men often find the town more
A  Ac
\.AS- •■'-""l appealing; they would rather court the.hazard of unemployment than work on
/*' nC,• 73 the land. It is the Dick Whittington syndrome, but there can only be one ^^ / In N
V K  . : <7 Lord Mayor at a time. The urban population of underdeveloped countries.O'"-) v A y m C i . . O
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h  j . , -'"grew at an annual, rate of 9 per cent between 1920 and i960 - twice the rate v
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1 of developed countries during their time of development. In Europe in the
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l830s_j when 13 per cent of the population lived in towns, urbanisation in-
* It,17creased by 1.2 per cent a year; at a similar stage of development the'
underdeveloped countries are experiencing a growth rat e^of...2..7-per_nent_.__ ^
Current urban unemployment is 29,000,000;in African alone , urban unemploy-
>-IS- j
1 . AI s C  , L c ' merit is 27 per cent (Power, 1979)
The lack of manufacturing industry
ll:l
results from the western cartel control of resources in underdeveloped 
countries; this control must be broken If the urban areas are to survive. 
If the urban areas do not survive, then they become parasitic on the
surrounding countryside and the horror of famine grows.
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Of course, we -as?r, we are not looking accurately at the problem. If
only they would control their population, if only they wouldn’t breed like
/ ' a-M
L /U^U  •/ rabbits, then everything in the garden would be rosy. At the nresent
^  '* 4 "  moment, the world population is increasing by more than 75 million peonle
•9 f  if'X. H•' c ' J j -  ■ /"per year .... 79 million extra mouths. Can mhe world support such a large
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increase, such a jump in demand? Most authorities would argue that this 
•" in impossible, but they tend to be number jugglers. A recent-study'-in * • ■
.rA ' ................the Scientific American, September 19?A, has.-es-timateu that ..it .is po^ s-innj-,, „
to feed between ten and thirteen times the world’s present population at
twice the minimum recommended caloric intake if suitable adjustments were
V
made in energy consumption. It is worth stressing that China has in fact 
introduced one of the most successful birth control programmes in the world
but only after she gained control of her own resources.
'// /^ '( If population control is not the answer, then can we suggest that the
underdeveloped countries follow more closely the earlier suggestions summed
agricultural
under the heading of The Green Revolution. Although/growth rates of 3-^
per cent were projected between 1963-735 the actual rate was 2.6 per cent.
This is because the Green Revolution is a high input technology depending
___on_-ideal ecological^ economic and political conditions^ ^U-ndhstci^.^lnfrcAT
istnuptupf.-,'lp,^ mbirlbpb''dd^ h3 GaiLAnd^opcl-weather. LAs a. development strategy,
J . _ *
! "it works down from an industrial conception of the world rather than up 
from the peasant experience - the experience of the majority of the world’s 
population who possess less than 2.3 hectares of land. Unlike the popula­
tion control solution which treats the symptoms not the causes, of the food 
crisis, the Green Revolution seeks to prolong the causes of the food crisis ^ v 
by strengthening the developed world's grip on the underdeveloped. The 
question should not be how green is the green revolution, but how revolu- /
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j . , b-tionary is the green revolution.
I , „ m \ /Uk^'With clear concepts of underdevelopment, dependency, marginality
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j |v ’ b  before us, we come to provide some solutions to the problem of
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/■pvA-^  ^ i ' J ' ' development, the nroblem of the food crisis. The first conclusion must be^
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l ) that penetration of the underdeveloped economies by the developed world is j
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damaging and,therefore, must be curtailed. Secondly, for real development
; l-
f  to take place it must be founded on a self-sustaining force of local self-
. ^  f _ I
t ^ reliance or self-help. Thirdly, the orientation must be "cowards the rural
!
sector because that is where the mass of peasants exist. Fourthly since :
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surplus agricultural labour is a problem in most developing countries, low 
'-cost labour using rather than capital using techniques should be employer 
| to the exclusion of the advanced but irrelevant western technology.
Fifthly, since even labour using'agriculture does not provide full time 
j employment, as we ’understand full time employment, it is necessary oo 
I provide employment generating minor development work and rural industry 
| with low capital requirements. Only when such a strategy of develop^enu 
1 occurs will famine danger be averted. If we then wish to play the igou 
market we will only be starving ourselves,for the underdeveloped world will 
have solved their problem. ____— -
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